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BY VICTOR S. YARROS
itTT 7"0RDS, \vords, words'", said Hamlet, and on similar oc-
V V jasions we make the same contemptuous remarks about ora-
tors, rhetoricians and politicians, or even about solemn theologians
and moralists, who use words, labels, cliches, tags, overworked
phrases, without attaching any real, sincere and definite meaning to
them.
Many a fallacy or pompous, high-sounding assertion may be
punctured by simply asking the speaker: "Pray, just what do you
mean? Please define your terms with some approach to precision."
To give one example. The late Luther pjurbank, the eminent
horticulturist and experimenter, observed that most of those who
say that "God is a spirit" have not the faintest idea of what "a
spirit"" is. and actually imagine God as an elderly gentleman with a
white beard and austere mien. The same may be afifirmed of those
who. less naive, tell us that God is conceived by them not as a person
resembling man. but as "a super-person." Of course, they cannot
possibly tell you what they mean by a "super personality". The
compound term has no definite meaning. It is a conscious or un-
conscious substitute for other terms, which had a meaning, but a
meaning outgrown and rejected as no longer entertainable. Bur-
bank was right, though he was abused for his blunt remark.
Again, there are words which, though possessing or carrying
no definite meaning, are charged with emotional significance and
conjure up, in any connection or context, a rich variety of images.
Words, as the poet said, not realizing the full deep meaning of his
words, "are deeds", alluding no doubt to words of this character.
To this category belong such words as love, beauty, virtue, truth,
justice, vierey. To say "beauty", for example, is to call on a hun-
dred dififcrent memories, images, perceptions and emotions. One
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may think of beautiful women, beautiful sunsets, beautiful land-
scapes, beautiful gardens, beautiful birds, beautiful poems.
In general, however, the meaning of meaning is a problem the
solution of which bristles with difficulties. And never has the im-
portance of a correct and satisfactory solution of that problem been
appreciated as keenly as it is to-day, by reason of the new theorie'
now current among psychologists, philologists, anthropologists and
philosophers concerning the origin and function of language, its
relation to thought and its role in promoting civilization and prog-
ress.
Generally speaking, there are two views of the genesis and early
development of language. According to one school, there is a sig-
nificant and vital correspondence between words and natural ob-
jects, sensations, sounds and simple feelings. This school has even
sought to explain things, phenomena, by studying the -words which
represent them. The other school treats language as, in the main,
conventional and artificial. It does not deny that some zvords were
suggested by sounds or appearances, but it finds little significance
in such correspondence. Words like gurgle, tinkle, rattle, clatter,
chatter, hum, etc., clearly enough indicate their source and origin,
but it is absurd to suggest that analysis and contemplation of them
will aid us in fully understanding the things they represent.
It is the second school which is rapidly gaining ascendency.
And of the remarkable and illuminating books produced by it,
"The Meaning of Meaning", written by Prof. C. K. Ogden and
I. A. Richards of England, is unquestionably the most profound
and philosophical. Its central propositions, moreover, are sup-
ported or confirmed by Prof. B. Malinovski, an anthropologist and
ethnologist of note, who writes of language and of meaning in the
light not of library research alone, but also of direct and practical
contact, under varying conditions, with surviving tribes in primitive
stages of culture. (Prof. Dewey, by the way, quotes Prof. Malinovski
with warm approval in his work on "Nature and Experience", which
the present writer has reviewed in this magazine.)
The book has attracted much attention and high praise, though it
is confessedly introductory and tentative. Its central thesis is, per-
haps, best summarized in the following brief statements of Prof.
Malinowski
:
"Language and all linguistic processes derive their power only
from real processes taking place in man's relation to his surround-
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ings."
"Lansaiage serves for definite puriDOses ; it functions as an instru-
ment u>ed for and adapted to a definite aim."
"Language in its primitive function and original form has an es-
sentially pragmatic character ; it is a mode of behavior, and indis-
pensable element of concerted human action."
"Neither a word nor its meaning has an independent and self-
sufficient existence. . . . \\"ords must be treated as symbols, and a
psycholog}' of symbolic reference must serve as a basis for all sci-
ence of language."
"The meaning of a word must always be gathered, not from a
passive contemplation of it, but from an analysis of its functions,
with reference to a given culture."
The authors of the volume under discussion, Messrs. Ogden
and Richards, show by illustrations drawn from philosophic, meta-
physical and aesthetic literature that even the term "meaning" is
not properly understood today, and that it is used actually in no
fewer than sixteen distinct senses. They argue that to imderstand
any word, it is necessary to regard it as a symbol and to know what
particular thing it refers to, while definition of a term is merely the
substitution of a better understood and better known term or symbol.
They stress the importance of distinguishing between the symbolic
and the emotive uses of language, and show that much confusion in
discussion and even in science is due to dififerent uses of the same
terms by the disputants. They show that language often influences
and distorts thought by its vagueness and ambiguity.
Indeed, the influence of language upon thought is Imt little un-
derstood by the average thinker. To quote the authors
:
"There are three factors involved when any statement is,made or
interpreted.
"(1) Mental processes. (2) The symbol. (3) A referent— some-
thing that is thought of.
"The theoretical problem of symbolism is, How are these three
related.
"The practical jiroblem, since we must use words in discussion
ati<l argunu'iU is, How far is our discussion itself distorted by habit-
ual attitudes toward words and lingering assunijiticMis due to theories
no longer ojK-nly held but still allowed to guide our practice."
Phantoms and superstitions associated with words that are in-
herited from the ])ast, from cultural stages long since outgrown.
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prevent clear thinking- and mutual comprehension. Savages attrib-
uted magic to words ; they were not altogether wrong. There is
magic in words, and it plays havoc with much that passes for exact,
sci-entific writing.
Hence, the greatest of all reforms now needed in philosophy
and the socalled social inexact sciences is reform in the use of
words—the deliberate and careful attaching of clear meanings to
all words employed for other than emotional purposes.
In the light of such observations and conclusions as these re-
garding the relation between words and the things expressed by
them, it is not difficult to point out the fallacies of writers on re-
ligious, ethical and metaphysical subjects who mistake words for
ideas or realities. Take a few examples.
We still often meet with the assertion that science and religion
are totally distinct provinces, with a high, insurmountable wall be-
tween them, and that the methods and procedure of science are
utterly alien to religion. ''Faith", or "belief", is all that religion
needs and demands, we are told, and without the emotional re-
actions which beget faith and belief religion is impossible. Men of
science, therefore, are admonished to leave all their notions of
evidence, proof, probability, and the like behind them when they
close the door of the laboratory or the research library, and be-
come simple and child-like again, or heed the very dififerent logic
of the heart, before venturing to deal with religion.
Those who use such phrases have simply failed to define the
significant words in them or to ask themselves whence those words
came and how they acquired any meaning, if they possess one.
There is no such thing as faith or belief without apparent evi-
dence or reasonable ground. Not every pretender, impostor or
self-deluded faker inspires faith in us. Christians do not take
the claims of Mohammed very seriously, and the followers of the
Arabian prophet, in turn, do not accept the claims put forward by
the worshippers of Jesus of Nazareth. Jews read the New Testa-
ment and the Koran with a critical mind, and the emotional reaction
produced in them is esthetic, not religious. They may admire the
style here, the form there, the substance or ethical message else-
where. But their "heart" jumps to no conclusion of the sort said
to be "spontaneously" drawn by the orthodox believers.
Again, the orthodox and naive Monotheist is overpowered and
awed by such a phrase in the Old Testament as "Thus saith the
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Lord". Those who think of the Lord as a jealous ruler, a stern
law-giver, an occupant of a celestial throne surrounded by angels
and archangels, attach a concrete, definite meaning to that phrase
which the Agnostic and the atheist deem childish, and the latter,
therefore, are neither overpowered nor impressed. On the other
hand. Agnostics and Atheists arc confessedly impressed by the mys-
tery of nature, the glories of the universe, the phenomena of space
and time, the miracle of life. They do not, however, solve riddles
by changing their names, or by inferring other and greater riddles
behind those sought to be explained.
Let us imagine a dialogue between one who uses words care-
fully, with appreciation of their value, and one who uses them
without reflection or understanding, the subject being the supposed
essentials of Christianity as a religion.
Believer: I respect and value science within its proper sphere,
but it has no jurisdiction over religion. It can neither prove nor
disprove my profoundest beliefs. Faith has its own logic.
Skeptic and Agnostic : And what, pray, are your profoundest
beliefs with which, you admit, science has nothing to do?
Believer: The existence of a personal God, the Supreme ruler
of all things, the creator of all things, and the divine origin and
mission of His only begotten Son, Jesus, the Christ, the redeemer of
man.
Skeptic : And how did you reach and form those essential be-
liefs?
Believer: They are spontaneous—in the nature of revelations.
They satisfy my soul and heart ; they give life meaning ; they solve
the riddle of existence ; they are supremely rational.
Skeptic: Are you certain of the spontaneity, or the revelation?
Would you possess the same beliefs if your education had been dif-
ferent, if your parents, teachers and other early guides had professed
lUuldhist or Mohammedan doctrines, or Agnosticism? Do persons
born and reared in a wilderness, or among savage tribes, and not
taught Christianity, acquire that faith spontaneously? As to the
rationality of your l^elicfs and their intcr])retaion of life, perhaps
you are too easily satisfud, and niistal<e words for ideas. What
seems to you irrefutable seems to me and to many others very
shallow, empty and not worth refuting. Cod. you say, created all
things, gave men frcr will, snttcrrd liini to fall, and llicn sent Jesus,
Ilis Son in human furni, to redeem man. \nu have no real con-
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ception of God, in the first place, and yon have no notion as to his
purpose, if any, in creating- man, or in letting him fall, or in saving
him, if he is saved, or if the word "saved" has any definite mean-
ing-, which is debatable, to say the least. Begin, if you please, by
attempting a definition of God.
Believer: Ah, to define God is to limit Him, and He is infinite.
The best we can do is to think of Him as pure spirit.
Skeptic: And what is pure spirit? Where do you find it and
how do you know it exists ?
Believer: Why, even science tells us that matter is ultimately re-
solvable into—into force, and that there is no such thing as matter.
No matter, then there can be no materialist philosophy. We revert,
then, to force, spirit, as the stuff of the universe, and the creator
of all this stufif, of course, is pure spirit.
Skeptic : Yes, there is no such thing as matter in the old crude
sense of the term, but we do not know what matter resolves itself
into. Call the ultimate constituents of atom spirit, if you like, but
that is only a word ; it has no definite meaning. What the stufif of
the universe is, no one knows, and if that be true, as it is, to call the
supposed creator of the ultimate stufif 'Pure Spirit' is not to throw
any light either on the stuff or on its supposed creator. "Material-
ism" is nonsense as a philosophy, of course, but so is spiritualism
or vitalism. These terms simply have no meaning. Science knowi
nothing and says nothing about cause or nltimates. Religion knows
nothing, either, about these things, but says much, and what it says
seems intelligible only because believers do not ask for definitions
and explanations of terms. Religion is just as ignorant as science,
and might better admit the fact, and belief in Jesus or in his mission
is justified only if it can be supported by evidence and probability.
The belief in the parthogenetic origin of Jesus is merely childish and
superstitious. Like beliefs, equally childish, are to be formed in other
and cruder religions. Talk of "saving" man is absurd. Man has
risen very slowly, and is still rising. He has sinned and still sins
against his ozm better self, but no one can save him from the con-
sequences of his folly, malice and hate. He must learn to control
his anti-social desires and impulses ; he must learn to behave like a
truly civilized being. He cannot be "saved" at a given arbitrary
period and licensed to start all over again.
To purify itself and appeal once more to rational persons, re-
ligion must begin by learning the meaning of meaning and avoiding
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the use of terms that conceal lack of thought and of ideas.
But some metaphysicians are as guilty as theologians of using
terms without meaning and erecting philosophies on fog, mist and
illusion. Take the naive old-fashioned idealist who asserts that
nothing really exists save our own dream or idea. \\'hen he asks
how we knozi' that alleged realities are real, and not fancies of our
own mind, he merely demonstrates the fact that he does not know
the meaning of the words used by all intelligent persons, nor the
origin and significance of words generally.
\\'hen I say, "I see a tree", it is idle for any metaphysician to
tell me that I am deceiving myself, and that I have nothing but a
notion or idea of a tree. I say the free is there, because these words
have to me a perfectly definite meaning. I can also think of trees in
Paris, or in Peking. I can thing of trees painted by artists. I can
think of trees I saw and climbed when a boy. Finally, I dream of
trees and know that I have such dreams.
Common sense easily perceives the difference between all these
images and ideas. Philosophy cannot afford to disregard and out-
rage common sense. Even if the naive idealists were right in some
sense, their conceptions would be irrelevant to the problems of life
and language. Perhaps there are no trees anywhere, and we only
think and say "they exist"? But our words have grown out
of our experiences, needs, feelings, contacts. We distinguish be-
tween trees seen, trees remembered, trees dreamt of. because these
distinctions are to us very real and very significant.
In truth, most of the empty controversies between naive idealists
and naive realists are attributable to carelessness, confusion and
unconscious muddling and shuffling in the use of words. To start
out with precise definitions and common meanings is to obviate
nine tenths of the futile and pointless discussions in which we in-
dulge.
Take, again, the dogmatic statement of some "mechanists" that
man is "onlv a machine". If they were careful in the use of terms,
they would realize that this proposition is pointless and eiupty.
Phvsi'tlogicallv man is a machine, of course, and no one disputes it.
But do all machines act as man docs, and docs the application to
him of the name machine take away his jieculiarities, his distinctive
traits, his unif|ue endowment ? Do machines write poetry, compose
symphonies, construct iiliilo^Mphir systems, build cathedrals, evolve
religions? Are inachines conscious of themselves, capable of re-
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flection, self-restraint and choice? Do machines reason, draw in-
ferences, interpret facts? Do machines accumulate experience and
profit thereby?
Since man does things which no machine fashioned by him can
do, it is absurd to call him a mere machine. It is precisely his dif-
ferences that call for explanation, and no verbal explanation which
ignores those differences can possess the slightest value.
Illustrations of the essential theme of this paper, indeed, might
be multiplied indefinitely, as they are not confined to the fields of
philosophy, metaphysics and theology. We can find them in abun-
dance in economic literature, in political discussion, in sociological
treatises, in art criticism. Let one "burning" instance suffice—the
different senses in which the word "radical" has been used of late
and is still loosely used. What is a radical? One who goes to the
root of things, traces causal connections, makes scientific diagnoses
of social problems and prescribes adequate and genuine remedies,
says the thoughtful radical himself. A radical is he who teaches
destructive doctrines and would overthrow society by violence and
civil war, says the conservative. A radical is he who denies every-
thing, recognizes no principle, and demands license in the name
of freedom to experiment, says the ultra-conservative. In France
there is a radical party that is mildly liberal and a radical-socialist
party which is neither radical nor socialistic. Yet how much energy,
space and time have been wasted on attacks upon or defenses of
"radicalism!"
Decidedly, the beginning of wisdom and of understanding is a
correct and intelligent use of words and a firm grasp of their in-
tended meanings. No meaning, no word. No idea to express, again,
no word. New ideas require new terms, or frank and clear re-
definitions of old terms retained for convenience. If w-e are de-
termined to fight, let us fight not over misunderstood words, but
over definite ideas and conceptions, over actual difiFerences— of
which, fortunately or unfortunately, there is no dearth.
